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Abstract
Data transfer and staging services are common components in
Grid-based, or more generally, in service-oriented applications. Secu-
rity mechanisms play a central role in such services, especially when
they are deployed in sensitive application fields like e-health. The
adoption of WS-Security and related standards to SOAP-based trans-
fer services is, however, problematic as a straightforward adoption of
SOAP with MTOM introduces considerable inefficiencies in the signa-
ture generation process when large data sets are involved. This paper
proposes a non-blocking, signature generation approach enabling a
stream-like processing with considerable performance enhancements.
Keywords: SOAP, WS-Security, MTOM, Digital Signature
1 Introduction
Many Grid-based applications require data transfer and staging services in
order to deliver input data to and output data from compute services. De-
pending on the concrete application field, security policies play a vital role
in such services and are often a critical distinguishing factor.
In medical treatment or research scenarios, in which medical images are
transferred to simulation services, the confidentiality, integrity and authen-
ticity of the image data as well as the returned simulation results have to be
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ensured [1]. An according end-to-end communication security component is
a necessary building block for a secure transfer service for such environments.
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Figure 1: SOAP Data Transfer Protocol Stack
Due to the fact that Grids are more and more converging to Web service
technologies and accompanying standards, the application of WS-Security
and related specifications seems to be an obvious solution to provide such
security mechanisms for data transfer services. A closer look at the available
technologies for data transfer using SOAP reveals, however, that it is not
as straightforward as expected. Fig. 1 provides an overview of the available
technologies and their relationship for transferring (binary) data with SOAP.
Since the SOAP protocol elements are XML-encoded, data transfer using
SOAP falls back to embedding the data into XML documents. XML is
usually presented as a way of describing text data within the context of a
well-formed document containing meta-information (which is also text based)
meant to bring some structure and form to the text data. There are, however,
various domains that do not lend themselves nicely to being represented with
textual data only. Thus, technologies for the inclusion of binary data into
XML documents are needed and are obviously playing an important role in
data transfer.
There are several approaches to circumvent the binary inclusion problem.
A common approach is to encode the binary data into some string represen-
tation. In fact, the XML Schema [2] defines the base64Binary type that can
be used for this purpose. 3 octets of binary data are mapped to 4 octets of
base64-encoded data introducing a data expansion of 33% for UTF-8 text
encoding (for UTF-16 text encoding the data expansion will double) as well
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as additional processing costs for coding and decoding.
SOAP with Attachments (SwA) [3] is a W3C recommendation defining a
way for binding attachments to a SOAP envelope using the multipart/related
MIME type. The binary data is in an MIME attachment. It is referred
to from the SOAP message with a cid:-URI, which uses the value of the
Content-ID MIME header to find the corresponding attachment. This com-
bination of URI reference and raw data inclusion avoids the overhead and
bloat of encoding, but introduces other limitations. MIME uses text strings
to delineate boundaries between attachment parts. Consumers must scan
the entire message to find the string value used to delineate a boundary. Due
to the avoidance of an explicit length field, however, the MIME specification
places no actual limit on the size of attachments. MIME cannot be repre-
sented as an XML Infoset which effectively breaks the Web services model
causing e.g that attachments cannot be secured using WS-Security [4] in a
straightforward way.
A seperate profile has been published, which explicitly governs the usage
of WS-Security with SwA [5]. More specifically, it describes securing SOAP
attachments using SOAP message security for attachment integrity, confi-
dentiality and origin authentication, and receiving process of such a message.
Furthermore, the standard allows the choice of securing MIME header infor-
mation exposed to the SOAP layer, and also allows MIME transfer encodings
to be changed to support MIME transfer, despite support for integrity pro-
tection and SwA messages to transit SOAP intermediaries. However, a choice
of transport layer security (e.g. SSL/TLS), S/MIME, application using XML
Signature and XML Encryption, and other SOAP attachment mechanisms
(e.g. MTOM) is explicitly out of scope of this standard, and persisting sig-
natures and signing portions of attachments are not considered neither. It
furthermore needs to be taken into account, that before the security transfor-
mation can be performed, the attachment needs to be canonicalized according
to its MIME type. Thus, various MIME type specific canonicalizations need
to be supported, when applying this approach to secure SOAP attachments.
The Direct Internet Message Encapsulation (DIME) [7] is a Microsoft
supported Internet standard for the transfer of binary and other encapsulated
data over SOAP. The standard can be seen as an alternative to SwA and was
supposed to be a simplified and more efficient (in terms of decoding time)
version of MIME. The initial draft was submitted to the IETF in November
2001. The last update was submitted in June 2002. By December 2003,
DIME had lost out, in competition with Message Transmission Optimization
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Mechanism (MTOM, see below) [9] and SwA, and Microsoft now describes it
as “superseded by the SOAP Message Transmission Optimization Mechanism
(MTOM) specification”. The DIME specification was created to address
performance issues when processing MIME attachments. DIME is designed
to be a fast and efficient protocol to parse, avoiding to have to scan the entire
message to locate boundaries. The length of the attached files is encoded in
the message header instead, enabling large attachments to be processed in
chunks. The DATA field of an DIME record can contain up to 4 GB of
data. Although this is a physical limitation on the amount of data in a
single DIME record, there is no limit to the number of records in a DIME
message. Since large attachments can be chunked, the DIME specification
places no actual limit on the size of attachments. While DIME provided a
more efficient processing model it still do not provide an XML Infoset model
for the message and attachment. As for MIME, DIME breaks the Web
services model resulting in, among other things, that attachments cannot be
secured using WS-Security.
The W3C released a recommendation of a convention called XML-binary
Optimized Packaging (XOP) [8] to provide a way to package XML docu-
ments for purposes of serialization and transmission. In brief, XOP specifies
a method for serializing XML Infosets with non-XML, base64-encoded con-
tent into MIME packages. In the serialization step, an XML document is
placed inside a so-called XOP package (see Fig. 2). Any portions of the
XML document that are base64-encoded are extracted and optimized. Each
extracted and optimized chunk is replaced by an xop:Include element which
refers to the corresponding new location in the XOP package. Thus, XOP
enables to include binary data alongside with plain-text XML without influ-
encing the XML Infoset, hence allowing to apply for example WS-Security
to the whole message including all binary content. It furthermore promises
to result in a much smaller dataset than the equivalent base64-encoded data
without to worry about managing the binary data either on the encoding or
the decoding side.
In an attempt to leverage the advantages of the two techniques described
above: the “by value” and “by reference” approaches, the W3C developed the
SOAP Message Transmission Optimization Mechanism (MTOM) [9] specifi-
cation. Actually, MTOM is a “by reference” method, since MTOM attach-
ments are streamed as binary data within a MIME message part. Hence,
MTOM messages are valid SwA messages, making it fairly easy to pass
MTOM attachments to SwA or receive SwA attachments into an MTOM
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<m:data
 xmlns:m='...'>
 <m:photo>
  <!-- Base64 -->
  GLWBIMSSJQSG...
  RIYSp+5JDCOW...
  1Av5yy8En88Q...
  ...
 </m:photo>
</m:data>
<m:data
 xmlns:m='...'>
 <m:photo>
  <xop:Include
   xmlns:xop='...'
   href='cid:ID4PHOTO'/>
 </m:photo>
</m:data>
--MIME_boundary
Content-Type: image/png
Conetnt-TransferEncoding: binary
Content-ID: ID4PHOTO
Binary encoded PNG ...
<m:data
 xmlns:m='...'>
 <m:photo>
  <!-- Base64 -->
  GLWBIMSSJQSG...
  RIYSp+5JDCOW...
  1Av5yy8En88Q...
  ...
 </m:photo>
</m:data>
De-/Serialization
Extraction
Recon-
stitution
Figure 2: XOP Processing Model
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implementation lowering the cost of supporting MTOM for existing SwA
implementations. Most notably is the use of the xop:Include element to
reference the binary attachment of the message, which is defined in the XOP
recommendation. With the use of this exclusive element the attached binary
data logically becomes in-line (“by value”) with the SOAP message even
though actually it is attached separately. Hence, MTOM provides a compro-
mise between the MIME model and the Web services model since an XML
Infoset representation is available.
The paper will focus on MTOM for data transfer with SOAP, since it sup-
ports the efficient data transfer mechanisms specified in the MIME standard
and at the same time allows the application of WS-Security for realizing se-
curity services. Moreover, MTOM is the first data transfer mechanism that
is supported by all major WS platforms. The emphasis is drawn to the
signature of SOAP messages and MTOM attachments respectively, because
the conventional approach introduces delays at the sending side as will be
illustrated in the following section.
2 Signature of MTOM-optimized SOAPMes-
sages
The WS-Security standard specifies, that only data within the SOAP en-
veloped should be processed with the defined security mechanisms. Thus,
WS-Security cannot be applied to SwA or DIME messages directly, but can
be used to secure MTOM-optimized SOAP messages. (As noted above, there
is a separate WS-Security Profile which can be applied to SwA messages, but
it suffers from the same problems encountered when applying WS-Security
to the MTOM-optimized SOAP message.)
With MTOM, everything is inside the SOAP envelope, at least logically.
The physical treatment within the endpoints and on the wire is different.
Here large (binary) data are handled outside the SOAP envelope to reduce the
memory usage and the required amount of data for transmission. Whenever
the SOAP message or parts of it containing logically included data have
to be processed, the externally managed data becomes temporary part of
the message in order to perform the processing. This can be illustrated
conveniently by referring to the process of signature generation (see Fig. 3).
Before handing the message or parts of it to the WS-Security process-
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<soap:Envelope>
 <soap:Header>
  <wssec:Security>
   <ds:Signature>
    <ds:SignedInfo>
     ...
    </ds:SignedInfo>
    <ds:SignatureValue>
     MCpXybqBI2Aa3Yx4IovjN3...
    </ds:SignatureValue>
   </ds:Signature>
  </wssec:Security>
 </soap:Header>
 <soap:Body>
  <m:Patient>
   <m:Image name=”MRT_Scan”>
    <xop:Include
     href=cid:ID4IMG>
   </m:Image>
  </m:Patient>
 </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
XML
Infoset
Content
Pack
Temporary
Base64
Encoding
WS-Security
Processing
Layer
Content
Pack
No Encoding
Multipart-MIME Message
XML
Serialization
Sign Message
Figure 3: Signature of an MTOM-optimized SOAP Message
ing layer, the externally managed content needs to be included. This re-
quires a base64-encoding step, to temporarily construct the XML Infoset.
On this volatile XML document the mechanisms defined in WS-Security can
be applied and in the context of this paper especially the XML-Signature
[6] processing layer. The outputs of the signature generation process - the
digest and signature value - can then be placed into the WS-Security header.
Hereafter, the temporarily created message is discard and the content is still
managed external to the message in binary format.
3 Non-Blocking Signature Approach
The standard approach to signing a SOAP message when MTOM is used,
is to re-create the original XML Infoset before signing the message. As
the SOAP envelope is commonly in the first part of multi-part MIME mes-
sage, the signature must be completed in order to construct the WS-Security
header, which for large files this can be a considerable bottleneck.
To optimized the signature process a non-blocking approach is required.
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Ideally, such an approach should calculate the signature while the message
is being sent, i.e., such an approach would be streaming while at the same
time compliant with the current WS-Security specifications and compatible
with the standard SOAP processing model. To realize this ideal approach,
the basic idea introduced in this paper is to include a reference into the
ds:Signature element of the WS-Security header which refers to the actual
signature value contained and send it as the last attachment in the multipart
MIME format used to convey the message (see Fig. 4). A specific realization
of this idea advocated here is to use XOP to extract the contents of the
ds:Signature, then apply MTOM to send this content as the last part of
a multi-part MIME message. The digest values of the initial parts of the
MIME message can be calculated while the data is being streamed over the
network, leaving the actual construction of the signature until the system is
ready to send the last part of the MIME message (see Fig. 4).
<soap:Envelope>
 <soap:Header>
  <wssec:Security>
   <ds:Signature>
    <xenc:EncryptedData>
     ...
     <xenc:CipherData>
      <xenc:CiperValue>
       <xop:Include
        href=cid:ID4SIG/>
     ...
   </ds:Signature>
  </wssec:Security>
 </soap:Header>
 <soap:Body>
  <m:Patient>
   <m:Image name=”MRT_Scan”>
    <xop:Include
     href=cid:ID4IMG>
   </m:Image>
  </m:Patient>
 </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
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Figure 4: Non-Blocking Signature of an MTOM-optimized SOAP Message
Strictly speaking, XOP may only be applied to content of type xsd:base64Binary;
hence, if it is desired to be strictly standard’s compliant, one can first encrypt
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the ds:Signature element, then apply XOP to the xenc:CipherValue ele-
ment. (This is only a mild restriction since in practice, signing is quite often
followed by encrypting.)
Although it would be straight forward to implement this approach from
the bottom-up, the purpose of this paper is to explore how it can be made to
fit within a standard WS framework, which for concreteness, we take to be
the JAX-WS framework. (Although few WS frameworks are fully compliant
to the JAX-WS standard, most Java-based frameworks like Axis do adhere
to the JAX-WS processing model.) Following the JAX-WS standard, one
would use the Handler framework for implementing the WS-Security func-
tionality and the Java Activation Framework (JAF) along with JavaMail
for implementing the MTOM functionality. Within JAF, the data is put on
the wire through the writeTo(OutputStream outputStream) method of the
javax.activation.DataHandler. In particular, there will be one instance
of this class for each xop:Include element, with each instance writing to a
separate part of the multi-part MIME message. Hence, in order to realize the
goal of calculating the digest value while the MTOM data is being sent, this
class must be sub-classed and the writeTo(OutputStream outputStream)
method overridden to include calculation of the digest while the data is be-
ing streamed out. (At this point one could also encrypt the data using key
material passed in from a suitable WS-Security Handler.)
Unlike standard implementations where the signature is computed and
inserted into the SOAP header within a suitable Handler class, the WS-
Security Handler class developed here is only responsible for collecting the
security material and passing it to the data handlers as well as inserting
the XOP optimized ds:Signature element into the security header. The
actual work of preparing the signature is delegated to a second class extend-
ing javax.activation.DataHandler which is responsible for generating the
content of the ds:Signature element and inserting it (or its encrypted coun-
terpart) as the last part of the multi-part MIME message.
4 Evaluation and Discussion
In this section we describe an implementation of the approach discussed in the
previous section. Two popular Java based WS frameworks are investigated
here. The first, Axis2 from Apache has a WS-Security framework in which
the MTOM optimized parts are signed using the approach of reconstructing
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the original XML infoset. The second, XFire from Codehouse, does not sign
the MTOM attachments, instead only the elements appearing in the envelop
are available for signing. As XFire does not have a complete WS-Security
framework, the non-blocking approach was implemented in it and compared
with the standard approach from Apache Axis2.
The experimental set-up consisted of an XFire (or Axis) client on one PC
and an Apache Tomcat Server hosting the corresponding service on a second
PC connected by a 100 Mbps network. The client machined contained an
Intel Pentium 4, 3.2 GHz cpu, while the server machine contained a dual
AMD Opteron 2.6 GHz cpu.
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Figure 5: Performance of SOAP Message Signing Approaches
As a first step, the performance of both frameworks in the absence of
any security overhead was measured in order to set the scale for the absolute
performance. The results depicted in Fig. 5 show how both frameworks, in
the absence of security, are capable of transferring large files with a reasonable
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efficiency, i.e., the throughput is 70% of the peak bandwidth. The similarity
between the results is to be expected as both frameworks are using the same
components at the transport level, namely, the Jakarta Commons HttpClient
on the client side and the Apache Tomcat on the server side. Hence, the upper
curves in Fig. 5 simply demonstrate the efficiency by which large files can be
transferred using SOAP/HTTP.
The lower curves show the performance when signing large messages us-
ing the the blocking and non-blocking approaches. (For the non-blocking
approach, the signature, along with the rest of the message, was encrypted
in order to be strictly compliant to the MTOM standard.) As can be seen the
non-blocking approach is 50% faster than the blocking approach, although
both approaches are significantly slower than without signature. For the
Axis2 framework there is an additional problem in that the JVM crashes
with an out-of-memory error when signing large files. Presumably this indi-
cates that Axis2 is trying to completely recreate the original XML infoset in
memory before signing.
Finally, it should be emphasized again, that the present approach and in
particular its specific implementation has been design to enable a smooth and
seamless integration into existing WS frameworks and to be in conformance
with the related standards. A more straightforward realization would have
been to send the SOAP envelope as the last part of the multipart MIME
message and to set the final part to be the root part. To implement such
an approach, however, the underlying HTTP infrastructure as well as the
interface between the WS and the HTTP layer would need to support this
feature, which at present they do not.
5 Conclusion
Data services are a basic functionality in service-oriented environments such
as Grids. Depending on the concrete application field, integrated security
mechanisms are a vital prerequisite. Through the lack of appropriate stan-
dards, the application of WS-Security and related specifications has not been
easily possible. Starting with MTOM, SOAP messages can be processed with
WS-Security. However, when transferring large data sets such as given by
medical images, the application of the standard approach for signature gener-
ation based on WS-Security to MTOM-optimized SOAP messages introduces
a considerable bottleneck. The proposed and presented non-blocking signa-
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ture generation approach reduces the total transmission time significantly
which results in an increased throughput of 50% in comparision to the stan-
dard blocking approach.
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